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We explore the most relevant forces impacting the shift towards more ESG-related strategies in 
emerging markets. These include the challenges of climate change, social inequalities, and 
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. We focus on banks’ role in BRICS countries that are the 
biggest and fastest growing emerging markets economies over 2009-2020. We also discuss how the 
ESG agenda has been pushed by the United Nations (UN) and by regulators. Our evidence shows that 
banks’ specific adoption of international sustainability frameworks and agreements such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) are significant drivers of ESG engagement. Moreover, we find that a 
stronger ESG regulatory approach enhances banks’ sustainability practices in BRICS countries, 
especially for those that have lower average ESG scores. Two main implications can be drawn from 
our study: (i) banks should be encouraged to adopt international frameworks which provide universal 
minimum standards for corporate responsibility; and (ii) to improve the overall ESG information 
environment, mandatory disclosure rules should be introduced at country level. 
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Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues are becoming central to firms’ investment 
decisions in many countries around the world. The potential global risks stemming from unsustainable 
growth and environmental disaster have led the international community to give a bigger weight to 
corporate sustainability. From the UN Global Compact and the identification of Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) goals, to the adoption of the Paris Agreement1, many countries worldwide 
have committed to achieving better planet conditions including zero carbon emissions by 2050 with 
intermediate targets to be reached by 2030. The recent Covid-19 outbreak impacted on these action 
plans by contributing to greater global uncertainty and posing serious challenges for many businesses 
and across industries. It has also shown the urgent needs for building resilience in the financial sector, 
reducing inequalities and allowing a more sustainable growth.  
Many commentators observe that despite recent difficulties, the pace of green change has 
rapidly accelerated in the society as a by product of the pandemic (Martin, 2020). Two considerations 
have to be made here. The first is that the planet’s future and sustainability depend on all countries’ 
actions in the world, in the spirit of the World Health Organisation (WHO)’s refrain during the 
pandemic that “no-one is safe until everyone is safe”. The second is that, although some countries have 
made considerable advances in sustainability legislation, practices and reporting, others lag 
significantly. A case in point is that of the European Union (EU) member states that have made 
 
1 Adopted in 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a universal set of 17 goals with 169 corresponding 
targets that were agreed upon by UN member countries to solve some of the world’s global challenges within 15 years. 
Among the main objectives are to end poverty, improve health and education, reduce inequality, spur economic growth 
and concretely tackle climate change. The Paris Agreement is a UN Framework Convention signed in Paris in 2015 aimed 
at addressing climate change by taking policy action among signing countries. In relation to the financial sector, one of the 
core objectives of the Agreement is to “make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate-resilient development”. 
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extensive progress in recent years, paving the way to several vital reforms primarily to listed firms.2 
In contrast, in the majority of emerging countries progress has been slower as their economies rely on 
small businesses, and there are also supply chain issues to be considered. In addition, institutional 
factors and lack of reliable data are two major barriers. Emerging markets often carry a greater risk of 
institutional failures due to more opacity, corruption, and political instability (Gao et al., 2017). These 
factors affect firms’ behaviour and more generally the level of trust in the country’s system and 
institutions. Since bank-based financing is more prevalent in emerging markets, in this chapter we 
focus on the fundamental role of the banking sector. 
This chapter’s main aims are: (i) to carry out a literature review of the most relevant and recent 
studies on corporate social responsibility regulation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) using a systematic method; and (ii) to evaluate how BRICS countries compare in terms of ESG 
focus and to assess whether country-specific regulatory initiatives have had any impact. For this 
empirical analysis we employ data from Thomson Reuters Refinitiv, over the period 2009-2020 and 
run univariate and multivariate statistical approach.  
Our main findings suggest that ESG practices in BRICS countries require further development 
and more robust investments, especially to fill the gap with banks operating in developed countries. 
More specifically, first our analysis shows a fragmented puzzle in the ESG engagement in Brazil as a 
leader on all ESG aspects (ENV, SOC and GOV factors), whereas China appears as a laggard. Second, 
we find that bank size and the adoption of an international reporting framework such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) are key drivers of bank-specific specific ESG engagement. Similarly, our 
data reveal that being a “signatory bank” of the Global Compact (GC), positively correlates with better 
corporate governance engagement. Finally, by performing a univariate analysis built around the 
 
2 Recently, the European Commission has published a “Sustainable Finance Action Plan”, with the aim of defining all 




country-specific regulatory actions (see Section 2 and Table 3) to strengthen firms’ ESG engagement, 
we find greater effectiveness of a mandatory approach than the voluntary one. For example, we find 
after implementing The Companies Act in 2013, Indian banks increased their ESG score by about 
14%. Similarly, Chinese banks positively changed about 10% of their ESG engagement after 
implementing the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting Directive in 2008. Finally, the 
adoption of mandatory corporate governance requirements in Russia in 2014, appears associated with 
a more robust banks’ engagement of about 8%, thus corroborating the importance of a stricter 
sustainability regulation in emerging markets.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of recent ESG developments 
and the role of banks with a particular focus on emerging markest. It also offers a review of the most 
relevant literature on ESG issues in BRIC countries. Section 3 summarizes the data and methodology 
used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 illustrates the main results. In Section 5 we provide a brief 
discussion of our findings and some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 ESG developments and the role of banks 
The ESG literature is relatively developed for the EU and US, whereas in emerging markets 
there is less research available and regulation is less clearly defined. Duttagupta and Pazarbasioglu 
(2021) argue that although emerging economies are diverse and defy a uniform narrative, they have 
some common attributes such as sustained market access, progress in reaching middle-income levels 
and greater economic relevance. Typically these economies are much more engaged with global 
markets than the majority of developing economies and this justifies the focus of this study on BRICS.  
BRICS countries are the largest globally with a sizeable population and a strong potential involvement 
on the global supply chains; hence, with their actions and decisions, they can impact profoundly the 
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environment. This suggests that in a post-pandemic era, there is a need to push towards ‘smart’ fiscal 
policies such as government investment spending, ideally targeted to sustainable projects, particularly 
in the large emerging economies like BRICS (see e.g., O’Neill, 2021). 
Banks have a dual responsibility in this context because not only they are companies 
themselves, but also for the potential they have to select and finance sustainable businesses and projects 
in emerging economies which could impact the environment. This means that  banks will be indirectly 
damaging the environment or breach human rights every time they lend to highly polluting companies, 
or to companies that mistreat or discriminate against their employees. In addition, evidence shows that 
banks that care more about social performance are more resilient and less risky (Bouslah et al., 2018) 
which translates in a more sustainable financial sector as a whole. Similarly, Azmi et al. (2021) find 
that environmentally friendly activities have the greatest effect on bank value and highlight a positive 
relationship between ESG activity and both cash flows and efficiency.  
Over the past two decades, some progress has been made as banks have begun to pursue 
sustainability strategies, and many have endorsed or adopted global agreements which share the ESG 
values. Table 1 provides a list of the most relevant since 1992. Yet, according to a 2019 Bloomberg 
report banks ‘have dabbled in “responsible banking” only symbolically’. Although the corporate 
lending tied to cutting emissions or reducing food waste has surged eight fold in 2018 to $36.4 billion, 
the  Bloomberg report further says that sustainable lending is still small in the overall lending.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
On the other hand, ESG risks can impact banks directly (if, for example, their premises are 
affected by extreme weather) and indirectly, through their customers’ higher loan defaults. Some 
examples of ESG risks faced by banks is provided in Table 2 and distinguishes between environmental 
(ENV), social (SOC) and governance (GOV) risks. A study by KPMG (2021) has identified both a 
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financial and an extra financial dimension of ESG risks faced by banking institutions. The former 
refers to the consequences from ESG developments on the business models of both banks and their 
customers; while the latter focuses on the impact of banks’ actions on environmental or social issues 
of ESG risks faced by banking institutions. However, the recent study by Whelan et al. (2021) reports 
more than 200 empirical studies published since 2015 that showed that ESG boosted returns and 
improved downside protection, notably during a social or economic crisis.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
There are a number of relevant forces and factors that have developed over the past decade, 
impacting the shift towards more ESG-related strategies in emerging markets. These include the 
challenges of climate change, social and income inequalities, governance and more recently, the 
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. In terms of country-specific regulatory interventions, Table 3 
illustrates the CSR reporting and sustainable corporate governance directives in BRICS countries.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Specifically, we observe two main approaches to ESG practices and regulation in BRICS 
countries: i) a softer approach adopted by Brazil, Russia and South Africa, based on firms’ voluntary 
disclosure rule; ii) a more stringent approach adopted by India and China, based on firms’ mandatory 
disclosure including sanctions and incentives. 
Public listed firms are also required to disclose sustainability practices adoption by favouring 
the spread of internationally recognized accounting frameworks such as the Global Reporting Initiative 
framework (GRI) and/or the signatory of environmental and social sustainability agreements like the 
UN Global Compact. Specifically, the aim of the GRI initiative consists of improving the 
accountability and quality of environmental, social, and governance activities (Global Reporting 
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Initiative, 2011). It is a voluntary framework that can be adopted by firms worldwide which, by 
complying with their guidelines are able to harmonize the disclosure of CSR practices. Similarly, the 
UN Global Compact is a call to companies everywhere in the world to voluntarily align their strategies 




2.2  CSR regulation, ESG engagement and performance in BRICS countries 
To gauge the scientific contributions on CSR regulation in BRICS countries, we use systematic 
method to identify and review all papers on these themes published in the fields of banking, finance 
and economics available in the Scopus database until the first quarter of 2021. Existing research on 
aspects related to ESG issues is typically associated with CSR literature and most papers use the two 
acronym interchangeably (see eg. Liang and Renneboog, 2010). Similar to the approach of Kraus et 
al. (2014) and Diez-Vial and Montoro-Sanchez (2017), we select the following four groups of 
keywords:  (1) CSR regulation + emerging markets, (2) CSR regulation + BRICS countries, (3) 
mandatory CSR disclosure + emerging markets, and (4) mandatory CSR disclosure + BRICS 
countries. We focus on published papers in journals that are recognised as the most respected 
internationally in terms of novelty, significance and academic rigour. The final sample consists of 11 
articles, directly exploring the relationship between CSR regulations and firms sustainability and/or 
performance in BRICS countries. There are 5 papers each from India and China and one on South 
Africa (Table 4) and none on Russia. 
In India, studies following the adoption of the Indian Companies Act in 2013, that requires 
firms with a minimum net worth of Rs 500 crore, turnover of Rs 500 crore or profit of Rs 5, to spend 
at least two percent of their three-year average annual net profit on social welfare initiatives, find 
mixed results both on its effectiveness and on firm performance. For example, Aswani et al. (2018) 
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provide evidence that the CSR mandate is value decreasing, but only for firms that were not compliant 
before the adoption of the directive. Hickman et al. (2021) find that firms reporting CSR expenditures 
before the passage of the Act benefit from more earnings management using CSR engagement 
manipulatively in the pre-directive period. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Conversely, Manchiraju and Rajgopal (2017) stress that the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) around key events leading to the passage of the mandatory CSR rule is negative for Indian 
firms, warning on the risk of imposing social burdens on business activities at the expense of 
shareholders. Kansal et al. (2018) argue that the disclosures across all CSR themes in India are 
primarily narrative rather than quantitative or in monetary terms, suggesting to policymakers the need 
to assess practices and specific CSR requirements to enhance the performance and quality of 
sustainable practices. In contrast, Nair et al. (2019) by investigating the impact of the 2013 Act on 
financial transparency, find that CSR disclosure improves financial transparency, especially for firms 
owned by retail investors.  
The studies investigating the financial and sustainability consequences of the 2008 CSR 
mandatory regulation in China seem to be more likely to suggest a positive effect of CSR regulation 
on firms’ performance. For example, Liu and Tian (2021), by examining the impact of mandatory CSR 
disclosure on firms’ investment efficiency in China, conclude that firms subject to the regulation have 
decreased investment inefficiencies after the mandate, especially in cases of overinvestment. Similarly, 
Xu et al. (2020) find that mandatory CSR disclosure enhances firm value. Gong et al. (2018) find that 
CSR disclosure quality associates with lower costs of corporate bonds, and Wang et al. (2018) that 
mandatory CSR disclosure constrains earning management and mitigates information asymmetry, 
ultimately improving firms’ financial reporting quality. Conversely, Chen et al. (2018) document a 
firms’ profitability decrease after adopting the 2008 mandatory CSR requirement in China. More 
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precisely, the authors focus on CSR expenditure for Chinese firms, which increased after adopting the 
directive. This effect seems to be offset by a reduction in pollution in cities most affected by the 
directive. However, the positive effect of the directive in environmental terms comes at the expenses 
of shareholders and firm value, which strongly decreased in the post-directive period.  
Concerning South Africa, the only study we identified and reviewed by Stolowy and Paugam 
(2018) highlighs the lack of convergence in definitions of non-financial reporting between regulators, 
quasi-regulators and standard setters.  
Overall, the literature on ESG engagement in BRICS countries is generally quite limited and 
most studies appear to focus on China and India and on non-financial firms. To investigate the issue 
further we aim to: (1) explore ESG trends of banks headquartered in BRICS countries over a relatively 
long period (2009 to 2020); (2) test bank specific determinants of ESG performance in BRICS 
countries and (3) examine the effect of BRICS countries-regulations on banks’ ESG engagement.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data sources 
Our study focuses on bank-specific and regulatory forces affecting banks’ CSR engagement in 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the five so-called BRICS countries). We collect data on 
sustainability performance measures from Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv3 over 2009-2020 for financial 
firms headquartered in BRICS. Our final sample consists of 61 banks geographically distributed as 
follows: 8 in Brazil, 4 in Russia, 17 in India, 26 in China and 6 in South Africa. We follow the literature 
(Cheng et al., 2014; Liang and Renneboog, 2017, among others), and proxy banks’ CSR engagement 
with ESG scores, which are designed to transparently account for a firms’ relative ESG performance 
 
3 Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv is an enhancement and replacement of Thomson Reuters ASSET 4. We use Thomson Reuters 
and Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv as interchangeable in the text. 
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and across the following themes: resource use, emissions, environmental product innovation, 
workforce management, community respect, human rights protection, product responsibility creation, 
CSR strategy communication, shareholders’ engagement and inclusive board management. Thomson 
Reuters’ Refinitiv ESG scores range from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). Table 5 provides the definitions for 
each ESG pillar and for the GRI and Global compact signatory dummies. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
3.2 Empirical model 
Our identification strategy consists of two steps. The first aims to find bank-specific 
characteristics mostly correlated to ESG engagement. Secondly, we conduct a univariate statistical 
analysis to capture banks’ ESG engagement before and after the introduction of country-specific 
mandatory CSR regulation. Our baseline model is a panel fixed effect regression specified in equation 
(1):  
 
ESGi,t=c+β1GRIi,t+β2GCi,t+ β3Xi,t-1+ δi+αt+εi,t.    (1) 
 
where our dependent variable is the banks’ engagement in socially responsible practices measured by 
employing, alternatively, the following scores: the aggregate ESG score, the ENV score, the SOC score 
and the GOV score. GRI is a score reflecting banks’ compliance with the Global Reporting Initiative 
accounting framework; GC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for banks signatory of the Global 
Compact and 0 otherwise; X is a set of bank controls correlated to ESG score, and i, αt, εi, represent, 
respectively, time, country fixed effects and the error term respectively. Specifically, motivated by 
previous studies on socially responsible engagement (Lys et al., 2015; Chen at al., 2018; Liang and 
Renneboog, 2017; Paltrinieri et al. 2020), we control for the following variables that may affect banks’ 
ESG practices: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) score is equal to 1 for banks adopting the GRI 
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framework and 0 otherwise; the Global Compact Signatory (GC) dummy variable, equals 1 for 
signatory banks and 0 otherwise; banks’ SIZE, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, banks’ 
capitalisation ratio, measured as equity to total assets (EQ_TA); a proxy for credit risk expectations, 
that is loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLR_GL); an efficiency ratio measured as cost- to-income 
(CIR); a profitability ratio, the return on average equity (ROE); and finally, a liquidity ratio measured 
as cash to total assets (LIQ). These control variables are designed to capture the widely recognized 
positive effects of firms’ performance on the level of socially responsible engagement (Liang and 
Renneboog 2017), and thus to find banks’ specific characteristics mostly correlated to ESG, ENV, 
SOC and GOV performance. Table A.1 in Appendix shows that although most pairwise correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant, the magnitudes are relatively low. 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Multivariate analysis 
Figure 1 illustrates the minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, and maximum values 
using box and whisker plots of ESG, ENV, SOC and GOV scores by selected countries. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The box plot in Figure 1 shows that Brazilian banks reached the highest median values of ESG, 
scores, followed by South Africa, India, Russia and China. However, Brazilian banks are those with 
the greatest variability on ESG engagement (as represented by the extended blue area), especially on 
ENV performance, thus indicating a weak ESG performance convergence within the industry. 
Similarly, Figure 1 reveals a higher presence of outliers in South African banks, particularly for the 
ENV and SOC scores. These preliminary results may reflect the different exposure to global financial 
markets of South African banks, thus capturing again a fragmented picture. Finally, looking at the 
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median value of the ESG score, Figure 1 suggests that there is room to further adopt it, especially for 
Chinese, Indian and Russian banks, which obtain scores highly below the mean value of the ESG 
distribution. Figure 2 presents the time trend evolution of ESG, ENV, SOC and GOV scores from 2009 
to 2020 of Brazilian, Russian, Indian, Chinese and South African banks.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The figure clearly illustrates a steady growth of ENV, SOC and ESG ratings since 2009 for 
BRICS countries, with the only exception for the GOV component, that follows a different trend as it 
is slightly higher in 2009, although it exhibits a lower variation over the period.  Figure 3 partially 
confirms the box and whisker plot results shown in Figure 1, by disentangling ESG, ENV, SOC and 
GOV score by countries and years. Although Brazilian banks are on average the most engaged over 
the period, they seem to suffer in the most recent years, most likely due to the recent political 
developments. As widely stated in the literature (see e.g., Detomasi et al., 2008) the demand for firms’ 
socially responsible activities can depend upon the political structure, where typically democrats’ 
parties are more prone to make pressure on ESG activities (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014). 
Conversely, Indian banks are those obtaining the higher ESG, ENV, SOC and GOV growth rating, 
clearly represented by the yearly increasing trend. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
4.2 Regression analysis: banks’ determinants of ESG engagement 
Table 6 shows the results of the OLS regression specified in equation (1). In particular, looking 
at the banks’ specific covariates mostly correlated to the ESG, ENV, SOC and GOV scores, we rely 
on the statistical significance of GRI framework adoption, and of the Global Compact for the GOV 
score. Table A.3 shows that only the 21% and 20% of banks in our sample adopt the GRI framework 
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and are signatory of the UN Global Compact (respectively). Nonetheless, our results confirm the 
importance of internationally recognized ESG disclosure frameworks in favouring the spread of 
socially responsible engagement in BRICS countries. They are also in line with the literature (Romolini 
et al., 2014), which considers the GRI adoption essential in the process of standardisation and 
harmonisation of the disclosure of socially responsible practices.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Concerning bank-specific variables, Table 6 reveals that the most correlated variable to ESG 
scores is bank size. This result is confirmed in the ESG literature (see Liang and Renneboog, 2017) 
that also finds that on average larger banks invest more in ESG. Looking at bank capitalisation, proxied 
by equity over total asset (EQ_TA), we find a negative association with both ENV and SOC score, and 
a positive one with GOV. Thus, our evidence allows us to confirm the “doing good by doing well”4 
argument only for the GOV components.  
Similarly, ROE is statistically significant and negatively correlated only to ESG and GOV 
score, while for the liquidity ratio (LIQ) the relationship is significant (and negative) only with SOC. 
Taken together, these results indicate that banks headquartered in BRICS countries seem to typically 






4 “Doing good by doing well” means that banks invest on ESG only if they are profitable (Hong and Kubik, 2012). It should 
not be confused with “doing well by doing good”, that refers to the case where ESG investments enhance profitability 
(Dowell, Hart, and Yeung, 2000). 
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4.3 Univariate analysis: Country regulation and banks’ ESG engagement 
We also run a univariate analysis of the effects of country-specific regulations on banks’ ESG 
engagement. Specifically, by carrying out five different t-tests (one for each of selected countries) 
during pre and post directive periods, we examine if ESG scores changed or not after the following 
policy interventions: the 2012 Brazilian “comply or explain” recommendation for listed firms; the 
2014 adoption of the corporate governance code in Russia; the 2013 Indian Companies Act; the 2008 
Chinese mandatory CSR reporting requirements; and the 2009 South African King Act. 
Table 7 reveals that the changes from pre- to post-country regulation is statistically significant 
only for Russian, Indian and Chinese banks. More precisely, Indian banks increase by 14% their ESG 
values, Chinese banks by 10% and Russian banks by about 8%. Conversely, Brazilian, and South 
African banks do not seem to be significantly affected by sovereign regulation. These results are 
confirmed in Figure 4, which corroborates a significant change of ESG engagement distribution among 
banks headquartered in India and China. Although these results are mainly descriptive of ESG scores 
during pre to post government regulation, and thus may be affected by unobservable factors, we 
interpret them as if the stronger the country ESG regulation and the greater the ESG commitment. 
Therefore, we rely on the importance of clearer and stronger public actions in enhancing the 
environmental and social sustainable transition, especially in BRICS countries. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
5. Discussion and conclusive remarks 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues are of growing importance for 
organisations all over the world. Banks have a dual responsibility because on one hand they are 
companies themselves, and on the other they have a critical role in channelling funds towards 
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sustainable and responsible businesses and investments and in facilitating access to financial products. 
This chapter sets out to explore the current state of knowledge on ESG-related strategies, regulation 
and practices, with a specific focus on BRICS countries, that are the biggest and fastest growing 
emerging markets economies. It also empirically investigates the main drivers and factors explaining 
banks’ environmental, social and governance performance.  
Our findings show that banks operating in Brazil appear to be the most engaged on all ESG 
aspects; however, they also reveal a remarkable variation in the distribution of environmental and 
social scores hence suggesting the need for more harmonisation and convergence in the industry. 
Among the laggard countries, Chinese banks seem to perform significantly better on environmental 
aspects than on social and governance dimensions. Although the average ESG scores for BRICS are 
lower than in developed countries, we speculate that recent international social and political push for 
climate neutrality positively affected BRICS banks’ overall sustainable engagement. Looking at 
banks’ specific forces determining ESG performance, in line with previous studies, we find that size 
matters for sustainability, as bigger banks show a stronger ESG engagement.  
Our evidence also confirms the importance of international sustainability reporting standards 
and guidelines such as the voluntary framework GRI and the UN Global Compact, as significant 
drivers of banks’ ESG performance. It also demonstrates the central role of ESG regulation in 
enhancing banks’ sustainability practices in BRICS countries. Last but not least, after comparing 
BRICS regulatory actions toward a more sustainable business engagement (such as CSR disclosure 
regulations) during 2008 to 2020, we find that the 2013  Company Indian act, the 2008 CSR disclosure 
regulation in China and the 2014 Russia corporate governance code are most effective in enhancing 
banks ESG performances.  
Although our results are robust to different specifications (univariate and multivariate statistical 
analysis), they may be subjected to limitations and further development. Firstly, our findings may be 
affected by the data provider coverage limits, thus it would be useful to use alternative source of ESG 
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data to compare and discuss possible differences. This is in line with recent contributions (see e.g., 
Berg et al., 2020) highlighting the divergence of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings 
by rating agency. Secondly, our results should be interpreted as correlations between target variables 
and the dependent ones. Therefore, future research might investigate similar research questions by 
employing a more sophisticated econometric framework strictly designed for causal inference. 
Overall, this study confirms the importance of the demand-side as a driver for firms to develop 
ESG practices and contributes to the debate on sustainable business adoption in emerging markets. 
There are two main implications that can be drawn from our study that can potentially be generalised 
to other emerging countries: first, banks should be encouraged to adopt international frameworks 
which provide universal minimum standards for corporate responsibility, as these seem to be 
associated to higher ESG ratings. Second, to improve the overall ESG information environment, our 
findings also point to the importance of introducing mandatory disclosure rules at country level. This 
seems a critical point, because our analysis has clearly shown that BRICS countries designing more 
challenging corporate sustainability regulations obtain greater results in terms of ESG engagement 
than those relying on softer ones (e.g., Brazil and South Africa). Our evidence appears to be of pivotal 
importance in shaping sustainable business adoption and the need for more responsive policies in 
emerging markets, especially in light of the growing challenges the financial industry will face in the 
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Table 1. Global agreements on sustainability relevant to the financial sector 
Date Agreements Commitment 
1992 
UNEP (United Nations 
Environment Programme) 
Finance Initiative (UNEP 
FI) 
A global partnership established between the United Nations 
Environment Programme and the financial sector to accelerate the 
sustainable finance transition. 
1997 
Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) 
A framework proposing international guidelines of sustainability 
accounting to give the possibility to companies and organizations to 
align with them, enhancing the disclosure transparency. 
2000 
United Nations Global 
Compact 
A global framework aimed at aligning strategies and operations to with 
principles such as human rights respect, labour, environment and anti-
corruption 
2000 
CDP Climate Change 
Programme 
It is a not-for-profit charity aimed at encouraging the global disclosure 
system for investors, companies, cities, states and regions to reduce 
their environmental impacts.  
2003 Equator Principles 
It is a risk management framework, adopted by financial institutions, 
for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk 
in projects and business. 
2006 
Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI) 
It is a UN-supported network of investors and institutions aimed at 
promoting sustainable finance by incorporating environmental, social 
and governance matters in their businesses. 
2010 Climate Bonds Initiative 
It is an international, investor-focused not-for-profit organization aimed 
at promoting investment in projects and assets necessary for a rapid 
transition to a low carbon and climate resilient economy. 
2012 
Principles for Financial 
Action towards a 
Sustainable Society 
A set of guidelines for action by financial institutions concerned with 
the future of the planet and seeking to fulfil their actions towards 
environmental, social and governance aspects. 
2013 
Cross Sector Biodiversity 
Initiative (CSBI) 
It is a partnership between IPIECA, the International Council on Mining 
and Metals (ICMM) and the Equator Principles Association,  the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) aimed at developing and sharing good 
corporate governance practices related to biodiversity and ecosystem 
services in the extractive industries. 
2014 Montreal Carbon Pledge 
It is a signatory framework for institutional investors having a duty to 
act in the best long-term interests of stakeholders and that recognize the 
existence of long-term investment risks associated with greenhouse gas 
emissions, climate change and carbon regulation.  
2015 
TCFD (Task Force on 
Climate–related Financial 
Disclosures) 
It is a task force created by the Financial Stability Board aimed at 
improving and increasing reporting of climate-related financial 
information. 
2015 The Paris Agreement 
The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate 
change. It was adopted by 196 Parties at COP 21 (Conference Of the 
Parties) in Paris, on 12 December 2015 and entered into force on 4 
November 2016. Its goal is to limit global warming to well below 2, 
preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels. 
2017 The Social Bond Initiative 
It is a voluntary framework proposing guidelines such as transparency 
and disclosure to promote integrity in the development of the Social 
Bond market by clarifying the approach for issuance of a Social Bond.  
2018 Climate Action 100＋ 
It is an investor-led framework to ensure the world’s largest corporate 
and industry greenhouse gas emitters take necessary action on climate 
change. 
2019 
Principles for Responsible 
Banking 
A framework for ensuring that signatory banks’ strategy and practice 






Table 2. ESG Risks faced by banks 
Environmental Risks Social Risks Governance Risks 
Physical risks 
(arising from the 
physical effect of 
climate change) 
Transition risk (arising 
from the transition to a 







events such as:  











or bans on 
unsustainable activities 
(e.g. CO2 tax) 
 
Structural changes in 
demand and supply for 
products, services and 
commodities 
 
Noncompliance with labour 
standards 
 
Inadequate payment of labour 
 
Lack of assurance of 
industrial safety standards and 
health protection for 
employees 
 
Lack of assurance of product 
safety 
 
Compliance with tax law  
 







Lack of proper assurance 
of data protection 
 
Source: Adapted from EBA (2020) and KPMG (2021).
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Table 3. CSR reporting and Sustainable Corporate Governance regulation in BRICS countries. 















Voluntary for all 
listed companies.  
The Authority releases ‘comply or explain’ 
recommendations for all listed companies, 
encouraging them to state whether they publish a 
regular sustainability report and where it is available, 
or explain why not. 
None 
Russia 2014 The Moscow Exchange. 
Mandatory for all 
listed companies. 
The Authority implements new listing rules to 
upgrade the requirements for issuers to meet the 
Central Bank's new Corporate Governance Code. To 
be included in Level 1, an issuer must have a board 
with at least 20 percent, and no fewer than three, 
independent directors. Issuers' boards are required to 
create audit, personnel, and remuneration 




The Companies Act 2013 
is an Act of the 
Parliament on Indian 
company law (applicable 
since 2014). 
Mandatory 
depending on the 
company’s turnover, 
net worth or net 
profits. 
 The Act makes mandatory for companies with a net 
worth of more than Rs 500 crore, or turnover of Rs 
1,000 crore, to adopt a CSR policy. Companies with 
a minimum net worth of Rs 500 crore, turnover of Rs 
500 crore or profit of Rs 5 crore are required to spend 
at least two percent of their three-year average annual 
net profit on social welfare initiatives 
Failure to explain is punishable by a fine on the 
company of not less than INR 50,000 (about 
US$833) and up to INR 25 lakhs (about US 
$41,667). Further, officers who default on the 
reporting provision could be subject to up to three 
years in prison and/or fines of not less than INR 
50,000 rupees (about US $833) and as high as INR 
5 lakh (about US $8,333). 
China 2008 
The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) by 
issuing the Shanghai CSR 
Notice and the Shanghai 
Environmental 
Disclosure Guidelines.  
Mandatory for all 
listed companies. 
Listed firms on both SSE and SZSE (Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange) are required to disclose their CSR 
activities. The SSE has also developed the concept of 
social contribution value per share (SCVPS) to 
measure a company’s value creation. 
i) Incentives like priority election into the Shanghai 
Corporate Governance Sector are offered to 
companies promoting CSR activities. 
ii) Delisting and punishment for firm failing to 
disclose CSR activities 
South Africa 2009 
King Committee on 
Corporate Governance, 
by issuing The King Ⅲ 
Corporate Governance 
Act. 
Voluntary for all 
companies and 
mandatory to be listed 
in Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (as 
of 2010). 
The King Ⅲ code requires that firms describe 
financial, social and environmental factors within the 
report. Specifically, all company’s “material 
matters”, including sustainability risks, should be 





Table 4. Literature review on CSR regulation in emerging markets  








Research Objectives  Methods and data Main findings 
Aswani et al. 2021 India 
Investigates the value 
impact of CSR reporting 
spending requirement by 
the Indian Act 2013. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of the firm’s 
cumulative abnormal return, by performing pooled OLS 
regression. 
Data: Non-financial listed firms in India.  
CSR reporting mandate is value decreasing for firms 
not voluntarily engaged.  Firms that voluntarily 
engage in CSR, benefit from the externally imposed 
mandate.  
Chen et al. 2018 China 
Examines how mandatory 
disclosure of CSR impacts 
firm performance and 
social externalities. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of firms’ CSR 
performance and value, by performing a difference in 
difference regression. 
Data: Non-financial listed firms in China (A-Share, 
which are   domestic shares that are restricted to domestic 
investors and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) 
Firms included in the 2008 disclosure mandate 
subsequently experience a decrease in profitability. 
In addition, the cities that are most impacted by the 
CSR disclosure mandate experience a decrease in 
industrial wastewater and SO2 (Sulphur Dioxide) 
emission levels after the mandate.  
Hickman et al. 2021 India 
Analyses the relationship 
between CSR engagement 
and earnings management 
pre and post the Indian Act 
2013. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis OLS regression of 
management measures, by performing an OLS 
regression.  
Data: Non-financial listed firms on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange 
Managers substituted real activities manipulation for 
accruals-based manipulations while the greater 
regulatory enforcement of governance and reporting 
standards via the Act may have motivated other 





Focuses on the effect of the 
2013 Indian Act on 
shareholders' value. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis which combine the 
event study approach with a regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) to document the effect of CSR rule on firm 
value. 
Data: Non-financial listed firms on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around key 
events leading to the passage of the mandatory CSR 
rule is negative for firms affected by this regulation. 
Overall, results suggest that mandatory CSR 
activities can impose social burdens on business 






Explores the changes in the 
extent and type of NFR 
reported by firms in South 
Africa. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of the firm’s CSR 
performance, by performing a logistic regression.  
Data: Non-financial listed firms in Europe, United States 
and South Africa stock market exchange.  
There is a lack of convergence in definitions of NFR 
between regulators, quasi-regulators and standard 
setters. Moreover, they document a rise in the 
amount and extent of NFR from 2006 to 2016 in a 
leading country on matters of corporate reporting: 
South Africa.  
Liu and Tian 2021 China 
Considers the effect of 
mandatory CSR disclosure 
on firms’ investment 
efficiency in China. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of the firms’ 
investments inefficiency using a difference-in-difference 
method combined with propensity score matching to 
construct the research sample.  
Firms subject to the mandatory CSR regulation have 
decreased investment inefficiency subsequent to the 
mandate, especially in cases of overinvestment. 
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Data: Non-financial listed firms on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
Xu et al.  2020 China 
Investigates the roles of 
market and government 
CSR policy in China on 
firms’ value. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of the firm’s CSR 
performance, by performing an OLS regression. 
Data: Non-financial listed firms on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges 
CSR disclosure adds incremental value to firms, 
especially for Private-Owned Enterprises (POE).  
Gong et al. 2018 China 
Explores the relationship 
between CSR disclosure 
quality and the costs of 
corporate bonds in China 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of the firm’s costs of 
corporate bonds, by performing an OLS regression. 
Data: Non-financial listed firms on the Shanghai stock 
exchange 
Firms with high CSR disclosure quality are 
associated with lower costs of corporate bonds. 
Additionally, they show that compared with low-
quality or mandatory CSR disclosure firms, bond 
investors perceive firms with CSR disclosures rated 
above “A” categories or voluntary CSR disclosure as 
less likely to cause asymmetric information 
problems and thus charge lower risk premiums. 
Wang et al.  2018 China 
Examines the impact of 
mandatory CSR reporting 
on firms’ financial 
reporting quality. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of the firms’ earnings 
management using a difference-in-difference method. 
Data: Non-financial listed firms in China (A-Share, 
which are   domestic shares that are restricted to domestic 
investors and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) 
Mandatory CSR disclosure constrains earnings 
management after the policy and mitigates 
information asymmetry by improving financial 
reporting quality. 
Kansal et al. 2018 India 
Focuses on the level of 
CSR contributions 
disclosed by central public 
sector enterprises (CPSEs) 
in India. The purpose of 
the study is to investigate 
the impact 
of CSR guidelines on the 
reporting practices of the 
CPSEs. 
Methods: Qualitative approach where research issues are 
assessed using data from in-depth interviews of senior 
managers in CPSEs. 
Data: Interviews with 24 senior CSR managers from 21 
CPSEs. 
Disclosures across all CSR themes are primarily 
narrative rather than quantitative or in monetary 
terms. The authors suggest to policy-makers in India 
to assess practices and devise detailed and specific 
CSR disclosure (CSRD) requirements, rather than 
the current general mandatory requirements, to 
enhance the performance and quality of CSRDs by 
the CPSEs. 
Nair et al. 2019 India 
Investigates the impact of 
the 2013 Indian act on 
financial transparency. 
Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of the firms’ financial 
transparency (proxied by firms’ earnings aggressiveness) 
using an OLS method. 
Data:  Top 100 non-financial and non-state-owned 
Indian companies (by market capitalization) listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange.  
CSR disclosure improves financial transparency 
during mandatory disclosure regime. Additionally, 
authors find that ownership by the retail investors 
strengthens the association between CSR disclosure 




Table 5. ESG score and ESG reporting definition 
This table reports the ESG scores and ESG reporting dummy definitions.  
Pillar Category definition 
Environmental (ENV) 
It reflects a company's performance and capacity to reduce the use of materials, 
energy or water, and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain 
management, reducing environmental emission in the production and operational 
processes, and thereby creating new market opportunities through new 
environmental technologies and processes or eco-designed products. 
Social (SOC) 
It reflects a company’s effectiveness towards job satisfaction, healthy and safe 
workplace, maintaining diversity and equal opportunities. and development 
opportunities for its workforce, protecting public health and respecting business 




It reflects a company’s commitment and effectiveness towards following best 
practice corporate governance principles. 
Global Compact 
signatory 
Takes value of 1 for banks signing the global compact pact to encourage businesses 
and firms worldwide to adopt and report sustainable and socially responsible policies. 
GRI reporting 
Identifies banks adopting the Global Reporting Initiative framework to disclose ESG 





Table 6. Bank specific drivers of ESG performances in BRICS countries 
This table shows the OLS regression results on ESG, ENV, SOC and GOV scores determinants over 2009-2020 period. The 
dependent variables are the ESG (I), ENV (II), SOC (III) and GOV (IV) scores. The variables of interest are the GRI reporting 
and the Global Compact signatory. Control variable definitions are provided in Table A.3. All non-binary independent 
variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. The control variables based on accounting data (SIZE, 
EQ_TA, LLR_GL, LIQ, ROE, and CIR) are winsorised at the 1% of each tail. Country and year fixed-effect (FE) are included 
in all specifications. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote 









GRI reporting (-1) 0.0819** 0.0960* 0.0918** 0.0621 
 
(0.0319) (0.0510) (0.0371) (0.0503) 
Global Compact signatory (-1) 0.0800* 0.0778 0.0552 0.101** 
 
(0.0446) (0.0687) (0.0593) (0.0482) 
SIZE (-1) 0.0547*** 0.0736*** 0.0514*** 0.0540*** 
 
(0.0139) (0.0253) (0.0173) (0.0194) 
EQ_TA (-1) -0.0404 -0.364** -0.360** 0.555*** 
 
(0.121) (0.152) (0.162) (0.180) 
LLR_GL (-1) -0.0409 -0.599 0.301 -0.555 
 
(0.622) (0.759) (0.715) (0.959) 
LIQ (-1) -0.323 -0.442 -0.661** 0.343 
 
(0.335) (0.510) (0.299) (0.402) 
ROE (-1) -0.00451* 0.00224 -0.00231 -0.00968** 
 
(0.00254) (0.00389) (0.00307) (0.00420) 
CIR (-1) -0.0834 0.0169 -0.0522 -0.161 
 
(0.0520) (0.0536) (0.0367) (0.0971) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster S.E. Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 252 252 252 252 




Table 7. The effect of CSR and governance related directives on bank ESG score by BRICS 
country 
This table reports the univariate analysis of target variables (ESG score) from pre-Directive period to post-




Country Pre directive (1) Post directive (2) Difference (2-1) p-value 
Brazil 0.60 0.61 0.01 0.945 
Russia 0.38 0.46 0.08* 0.090 
India 0.36 0.50 0.14*** 0.000 
China 0.30 0.40 0.10** 0.040 







Figure 1. ESG values Boxplot by BRICS countries 
This figure shows the lower values, lower quartile, median, higher quartile, and higher values (Boxplot) of ESG, 
ENV, SOC and GOV scores in BRICS countries over 2009-2020 period.  
 
       
 
       
 















Figure 2. Trends in ESG, ENV and SOC scores  










Figure 3. ESG scores trend line by BRICS countries 
This figure shows the time trend of ESG, ENV, SOC and GOV scores by BRICS countries 
over 2009-2020 period.  
 
 
           
 








Figure 4. Box-plot trend pre- and post- BRICS regulation 
This figure reports the graphical plots (Panels A-E) of target variables (ESG score) from pre-Directive period to post-Directive by 
BRICS specific country regulation. Panel A, shows the lower values, lower quartile, median, higher quartile and higher value of 
ESG score in Brazil pre and post directive (2012 Comply or explain requirements); Panel B, shows the lower values, lower quartile, 
median, higher quartile and higher value of ESG score in Russia pre and post directive (2014 Corporate Governance regulation); 
Panel C, shows the lower values, lower quartile, median, higher quartile and higher value of ESG score in India pre and post directive 
(2013 Indian Companies Act); Panel D, shows the lower values, lower quartile, median, higher quartile and higher value of ESG 
score in China pre and post directive (2008 CSR directive); Panel E, shows the lower values, lower quartile, median, higher quartile 




      
 
 




Panel A: Pre (left) and Post (right) 2012 
Brazilian Comply or explain requirements. 
 
Panel B: Pre (left) and Post (right) 2014 
Russian Corporate Governance regulation. 
 
Panel C: Pre (left) and Post (right) 2013 Indian 
Companies Act. 
 
Panel D: Pre (left) and Post (right) 2008 
Chinese CSR directive. 
 
Panel E: Pre (left) and Post (right) 2009 South 




A.1 Correlation matrix  
This table shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical analysis over the period 2009–2020. The superscripts * denote coefficients statistically different from zero 
at the 5% in two-tailed tests. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ESG 1 
           
2 ENV 0.7480* 1 
          
3 SOC 0.8827* 0.7109* 1 
         
4 GOV 0.6829* 0.2557* 0.3048* 1 
        
5 GRI 0.5823* 0.6025* 0.5365* 0.2662* 1 
       
6 GC 0.4865* 0.4881* 0.4623* 0.2409* 0.3357* 1 
      
7 SIZE (log) 0.2941* 0.4519* 0.2079* 0.1714* 0.4132* 0.1204* 1 
     
8 EQ_TA -0.1564* -0.2245* -0.1843* 0.0040 -0.0076 -0.0952* -0.3474* 1 
    
9 LLR_GL -0.0462 -0.0793 0.1056 -0.2027 0.0092 0.0998 -0.1611* 0.1253* 1 
   
10 LIQ -0.1779* -0.0462 -0.2440* -0.0445 -0.0060 -0.0616 0.1665* -0.1306* 0.2489* 1 
  
11 ROE 0.0326 -0.0231 -0.0477 0.1209* -0.0410 0.1475* -0.0708* 0.0356 -0.0178 0.1297* 1 
 
12 CIR 0.1302* 0.1554* 0.2808* -0.1331* 0.0101 0.2080* -0.0650 -0.0766* 0.2161* -0.1068* -0.2219* 1 
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A.2. ESG bank coverage 
This table shows the number of ESG banks in our sample covered by Thomson Reuters and the number of total banks available during 
the total period of analysis (2009-2020). 
Country  No. of ESG banks available  Total Banks 
Brazil 8 23 
Russia 4 24 
India 17 48 
China 26 55 





A.3 Descriptive statistics 
This table summarizes the main statistics for all our variables and for the period 2009-2020. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev P 25 P 75 
ESG 0.461 0.180 0.281 0.834 
ENV 0.337 0.258 0.210 0.837 
SOC 0.481 0.216 0.270 0.863 
GOV 0.487 0.230 0.004 0.961 
GRI 0.217 0.412 0 1 
GC 0.197 0.398 0 1 
SIZE (Billions of dollars)   315,000 636,000 3,614 358,000 
SIZE (log)   18.000 20.130 16.660 19.502 
EQ_TA 0.109 0.142 0.059 0.147 
LLR_GL 0.039 0.035 0.020 0.050 
LIQ 0.091 0.063 0.047 0.127 
ROE 0.164 0.073 0.127 0.207 
CIR 0.493 0.333 0.283 0.591 
Note: SIZE= Natural Logarithm of total assets; EQ_TA= Equity to total assets; LLR_GL=Loan Loss Reserves to 
gross loans; CIR=Cost-to-Income ratio; ROE= Return on average equity; LIQ= Cash to total asset.  
Source: Thomson Reuters. 
 
 
